Welcome to today's webcast on a shifting global landscape. What lies ahead? I'm David Young, the President of the Committee for Economic Development, the public policy center here at the Conference Board. From terrorists to foreign investments to the US military role in Europe, the new administration here in the US has embarked on significant policy changes with implications for the US role in the world and for the broader geopolitical and Geo economic environment. These implications also affect US businesses quite directly as they seek to navigate not only the changes in Washington DC, but a shifting global landscape as well, all in a climate of uncertainty and a weakening economic outlook. We'll consider today several issues. Firstly, what is propelling the changes in the US administration? How the reality of tariffs rather than open trade is affecting geoeconomic relations and U.S. trade. How the perception of the US is changing around the world, How US businesses are developing new strategies in response and the next steps in US relations with China, the EU, the UK, North America and prospects for the conflict in Ukraine. We have a distinguished panel with us as usual today. Joining us, Anna Maria the Salva, the Global Chairman at the Person Group, and also, I'm delighted to say, a CED trustee. We have Sir Simon Gass, the former chair at the UK Joint Intelligence Committee and formerly Her Majesty's Ambassador to Greece and Iran, and now a senior advisor at SC Strategy. And finally rolling us out, Nick Redmond, the Director of Analysis and the Editor in Chief at Oxford Analytical. Welcome to all of you. Now, just a quick housekeeping message here. If you need an attendance certificate for this webcast, please click the icon shown to download your certificate at the end of the webcast. You can use that to claim continuing education credits if you hold a certification. So we've got 5 interesting chapters to cover today. Firstly, setting. We'll try and set the scene as best we can. We'll look at geoeconomics. We'll look at the global perception of the US. We'll look at the geopolitical horizon and then we'll take some moments to look at what next. So with that said, again, welcome to the panelists and we'll get right into the conversation. Now, I would first like the panelists to set the stage. We're now beginning the 2nd 100 days of the second Trump administration. How would each of you start to characterize the changes that have occurred both in Geo economics and geopolitics and what is the perspective propelling the changes from this new administration? Let's start Anna Maria, let's bring you straight into the conversation and and maybe also get some of your thoughts and responses from the business community. And how are businesses and business leaders managing through this period of change? Well, thank you, David very much. And since I'm the first to speak, let me also just acknowledge that I'm honored and grateful to be a part of this discussion today and the panel is distinguished. Dr. Simon Gass and Nick Redmond, you know, really bring deep insight to each of these issues and I'm eager to speak with them. I'm also interested to see what might change in the world by the time we're at the end of this webcast. The pace of change is quite dynamic, and we are clearly in a moment approaching structural train change where trade and geopolitics and national security are fusing more profoundly than perhaps ever before or that we've seen in recent decades. And these shifts we see in our business are really redefining how governments engage with each other, how businesses must plan and operate, and also how we think about resilience and competitiveness in a world that is more fragmented. It's a more fragmented global environment now for businesses to operate. The stressors, the geopolitical stressors that are driving this change obviously include the escalating US and China rivalry, the war in Ukraine and its global consequences. We've been dealing with the weaponization of supply chains and critical minerals. And there's been really a broader retreat from multilateralism in favor of protectionism and strategic economic alliances. So, you know, as we discussed the Trump administration's efforts to reset trade policy today, we also have the backdrop of peace talks in Istanbul for a conflict that has reshaped the global trade environment and sharpened the role and elevated the role of economic statecraft. So if if we consider sort of double click on the administration's current trade policy activity, you know, the administration has expressed a broad set of ambitions related to this geopolitical backdrop, you know, from rebalancing global trade to enhancing US competitiveness to strengthening foreign policy leverage and national security. But the current path to these objectives has introduced considerable ambiguity. And while the administration is visibly making initial moves that are often intended to trigger recalibration and deal making, and the direction is ambitious, the process is by design disruptive. And you know, the the long term solutions will always be multifactorial. And as such, I have heard from several types of key stakeholders that it's really not clear for the moment what success looks like. And so that uncertainty is creating an unstable operating environment right now for businesses, both large and small business. You know, our clients are mostly large businesses. And what we see is that many American businesses really broadly support the underlying goals of the administration, especially the emphasis on physical health, on competitiveness, and on strategic autonomy. At the same time, this level of uncertainty is forcing businesses to ensure their resilience in the face of a multitude of potential outcomes. So, you know, I think despite the market's favorable response to the recent de escalation with China, leading companies are still really focused on what could happen. They're closely monitoring developments. Some of them are establishing war rooms and considering what are the no regrets moves they can make now that will enable the right long term options as the ultimate tariff regime becomes more clear. And this includes ensuring supply chain continuity, really thinking about their liquidity, and also strengthening their customer relationships. These are, you know, we see some clients also conducting several dimensions of scenario planning. And fortunately now with the benefit of new AI tools that can really cope with multitudes of variables at scale and with speed, they're, you know, really looking at lots of different types of solutions and outcomes, you know, down to the franchise level, the product level, even the SKU level. Because for some of these companies, the changes in in tariffs will be quite material. The most effective companies are also taking care right now to engage really thoughtfully with all of their key stakeholders, including and especially governments in the US government to inform direction, to preserve trust and also their license to operate. We also see large multinationals leaning much more into regionally focused operating models and that's a trend that began earlier through the effort to de risk supply chains, but now we see that that effort has a broader scope. So while we're talking about businesses, just very briefly, I should really add that small and medium sized companies which support so much of the US economy don't really have the financial depth to absorb higher costs. And many who are dependent on imports, especially from China, are needing to plan for a decline in revenue and profitability. So we're sort of at the early stages of that with companies of different sizes. So I would say the theme is, you know, managing the short term to achieve the right long term is very consequential in this moment, both for government and for business. And I hope that helps set some of the frame and of course on. Thank. You. Thank you, Anna Maria. It's really interesting when you started talking about resilience, competitiveness, the fragmented role around the world, but you also the the importance and dimensions of scenario planning, but also thoughtful stakeholder engagement, I think are all critical themes. With that said, let me bring in so Simon Gass, then we'll hand it over to Nick. So Simon, thoughts, reflections from from your perspective. And as we were saying before, the cool while the UK is not part of the of the EU, as a sympathetic near neighbor, thoughts about what's happening in the EU as well. Well, thank you, David. And it really is a great pleasure and privilege to be able to engage with this group today. So I I would put it into quite a broad context to start with and then perhaps narrow it down and I might put it a little bit like this. Anna Malia has spoken about the speed of policy change. What I would say was the massive unpredictability of U.S. policy making in a range of areas. We can sometimes see a direction of travel, but trying to work out the detail has become extremely difficult. And as I was thinking about this before joining this call, I was reflecting that I first became a British diplomat nearly 50 years ago, a little bit short of 50 years ago. And throughout my career, I have never been in doubt that the United States and the United Kingdom and broadly speaking, the Europeans, we're in an environment in which we might compete, we might occasionally argue, but which fundamentally we would cooperate. And we were all pointing in roughly the same direction in terms of what we wanted out of the world. I would say that for the first time many Europeans are finding that that assumption has been shaken by the events of the last three or four months in a variety of ways. And I'm sure we'll pick up some of these issues as we drive through the the program today. But let me just take 4 examples. Firstly, we're clearly going to come back to the question of tariffs. It's not simply the speed and the scale of the tariff announcements which President Trump made. And after all, we knew that the word tariff increased tariffs coming. So the fact of them was not a surprise to anybody, but the speed and the scale of them, but then also the whiplash effect as these tariffs are then taken away, amended all seemingly at very short notice. And therefore the unpredictability which Anna Maria spoke of, which effects companies globally, their investments globally, their supply chains and every other part of that. So that'll be my first observation about tariffs. Secondly, in in terms of security, the United States has been telling the Europeans for pretty much as long as I can remember that the Europeans need to get serious about defence and security. And the Europeans on the whole have tried to ignore that message from the United States. And therefore, I do not criticize President Trump at all for driving that message home in a pretty brutal way, because past attempts at talking to the Europeans nicely about this have simply not delivered the result. So we would completely agree that the Europeans need to get more serious about security. But there is a lot of nervousness in Europe about whether the commitment of the United States under President Trump to our collective security in NATO is as strong and as unified as we have believed for the last 70 years. So there is that nervousness about whether the United States is still the predictable, reliable ally which we had assumed in the past, even whilst we recognize that for years now the United States attention has been drifting for perfectly understandable reasons, gradually away from Europe and more towards China and the Pacific. So security, I would say, was the second issue. The third issue for me as somebody who works in geopolitics is around the US role in the world. And again, it's the unpredictability that I think is so unnerving Europeans. And you know, we we don't want to trivialise this. You know, it may sound at least to us in Europe, faintly bizarre when AUS president says that he aspires that Canada should become the 51st state of the Union. But nevertheless, this is coming consistently from the most powerful man in the world, the president of the United States. Similarly, when we see President Zelensky of Ukraine being pretty beaten up in the White House. And again, I, I, I'm not trying to delve into the rights and wrongs of that particular conversation, but it did come as a pretty breathtaking moment for many of us in Europe who take it as an article of faith that the Ukrainian people are fighting a brave and lonely struggle against a vicious oppressor. And then lastly, and this in a sense it's over it all is there is a strong sense in Europe that many in this administration feel an animosity towards Europe, which we sometimes find a little bit hard to understand. I mean, examples of that, you know, President Trump says that the European Union was was invented to screw the United States, to use his word rather than mine, which is a curious reading of history. And, and when Vice President Vance comes to the Munich Security Conference and tells us that the threat to Europe does not lie in Russia and China so much as lack of commitment to democracy and free speech in Europe, we find these things quite strange. So there is a good deal of uncertainty. What I would say, though, just to conclude my remarks, is that I think almost all Europeans want to take this as calmly and rationally as we can, not run around with our hair on fire shouting that the world is going to come to an end, but trying perhaps to distinguish between three different things. Firstly, how much of this is about the Trump 1st 100 days? Secondly, how much of this is about the second Trump administration as a whole? In other words, how much of this is going to last through the whole administration? And thirdly, and I think this is, is extremely important, trying to understand how much of this is happening because of trends which are going to outlast President Trump in the United States, realigned attitudes towards global affairs, towards the American economy, towards the relative priorities of the United States. So trying to distinguish between those three elements, I think is an important part of what the Europeans are trying now to do. Thank you. Thank you, Sir Simon, very insightful. Nick, let's get you involved in the conversation here. You have a a unique perspective in your role at Oxford Analytica, which is a leading geopolitical analysis and advisory firm. To just couple, couple points for you Nick here. Just any reflections you have on what Sir Simon and Anna Maria have said, but also other other thoughts reflections to help set the scene here for today's conversation. Thank you, David, thank you for inviting me. I thought Anna Maria's observation about companies trying to arrive at no regret decisions right now given the the uncertainty was a really interesting one because the business has obviously been waiting in wait and see mode now for quite a while. But you can't. I can only you can only hold your breath for so long. And I'm not sure the turbulence is necessarily going to subside. My list of how Trump administration has repositioned the United States and the world is very similar to to Simon. So obviously, there's been a big move on trade, defensive alliances to which I would add actually international organizations and treaties to. And then the values aspect of it. Does the United States support democracy in the world? Does it promote values? To what extent does it condition its relations with other countries on those, on those criteria? Now, if we think about those for a moment, the Trade 1 was really well trailed. United States in 2016 had two presidential candidates, both of whom were trade skeptics. President Biden didn't really roll back any of President Trump's first term trade restrictions didn't revive. The WTO actually pushed protectionism somewhat further with the Inflation Reduction Act. So that was what trailed US view and US engagement in the world. If you look at the Chicago Council for Global Affairs polling of Americans, which they've done every year since 1974, you can see that generationally as the United States gets younger or others, as the older generations pass away and new generations come through, there is less of a sense that the United States really must and has no choice but to engage in the world and have a very forward leaning role. So that too is something where Trump is sort of surfing a wave of public opinion to speak partly to this question Simon had about how much of this is just passing trend as opposed to something that's or of a new reality. But the focus on democracy and values, that is something that really we had no warning about sort of prior to Donald Trump. And that's where I think the big, the big surprise has come. Now, how does this play in the rest of the world? In some parts of the world sort of beyond Europe, they're pretty cool about this. Gulf States, for instance, delighted not to have lectures on on democracy. I'm very willing to go ahead and and do business with the United States. If we think about that region particularly, probably there's less appetite for confrontation with around now than there was during the first term. But I think a lot of the parts of the world really quite sort of content with the United States on this point, but very worried about the the trade aspects and and the security aspects too, particularly in East Asia and Europe as the two parts of the world that that have prospered under decades of of American security guarantees. In final point on China, which I know we'll get on to down the line, China clearly is quite apprehensive about this new US administration. They can see within the administration, there are some people that are definitely China Hawks, these people that don't appear to have the upper hand right now. But four years can be a long time. But at the same time, China definitely not willing to bend the knee. If you look over the past sort of two years, as China has faced an increasing number of U.S. trade restrictions, the response has got tougher over time. A year ago, two years ago, the sense was we're going to respond, but we're not really going to match like for like. We don't want to trigger escalatory dynamics. There's still no wish for escalation. But what we saw in the last few months is if the United States puts triple digit tariffs on China, they're going to come right back from the Chinese. So I think that's a very difficult dynamic to look for. China is not looking to start anything, but it's not going to back down. Right now. What they need domestically is just a period of external calm so that they can fix some of the domestic problems that they're they're telling that they're tackling right now. Thanks, Nick. Moving on to we've we've so Simon mentioned the tariffs. So let's move on to kind of do economics in this big issue area and the speed and policy changes with regards to tariffs. And Anna Maria, I want to kick it off with you, if that's OK. You know, obviously it's, it is one of the biggest stories that we've seen in Trump's first 100 days. It's not going anywhere and it's not subsiding. So what from your experience in the conversations you're having with businesses, Anna Maria, what do you see as some of the biggest shifts in trade patterns and and business strategy as a result of of this changing trade and tariff landscape? Sure. You know, we're really keeping track I would say right now of four important dynamics. The first being that, you know, we're seeing an acceleration of supply chain diversification. So the companies that really began de risking either during the pandemic or as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, they are now doing more or moving faster wherever possible. You know, it's, it's really hard to make sudden massive capital deployment decisions in, in such a dynamic and unclear environment. So it would be premature to say that people are pivoting now in response to the current trade dialogue. But there have been companies who have have been thinking about these issues for some time and have made moves earlier that now they're able to double down on or to accelerate. And we see that, for instance, with Apple having expanded iPhone production in India and Vietnam, in addition to the extensive investment commitments they've made to the United States in the first quarter, they've been communicating about their supply chain shifts. Pfizer is a good example of a major company that's reassuring key pharmaceutical inputs to reduce geopolitical exposure. And we expect to see more of this across tech, pharma, retail and companies are really prioritizing resilience over lowest cost sourcing. Second, there's clear disruption to the North American automotive supply chain and that's been getting, that's been quite visible for obvious reasons. GM and Ford have reported significant financial pressure and they've paused share buybacks. And in Canada, Honda has delayed a major EV investment, citing policy uncertainty tied to US tariffs. And that's had an impact in in multiple ways. So it's really we're seeing a direct hit there to what's previously been a highly integrated cross-border production system under NAFTA and now USMCA. The third dynamic we're tracking right now is that you know, Chinese imports have dropped situationally over the last couple of months, especially as after tariffs rose to as high as 145%. And that's leading to the possibility we've been hearing of temporary product shortages especially later this year. Think back to school. Thank Christmas, you know, in toys, electronics and household goods. And large retailers now are returning to Chinese sourcing. They're absorbing tariffs just to keep their shelves stocked. But they're trying to work out, you know, how to accommodate those costs. And just this morning, Walmart, I saw, you know, in their earnings communications acknowledge that some of those costs will be unavoidably passed on to the consumer. And finally, you know, another important dynamic has to do with semiconductors now being under renewed stress. And of course, there's been a legacy supply demand challenge that's with which we're all very familiar. But the the changing tariff situation is introducing new friction so the tariffs can hit inputs and equipment used to build and scale US chip production. Retaliatory tariffs from trading partners are affecting certain tech components and export flows. And, you know, also we can keep in mind that when tariffs supply to goods that use chips, you know, examples are EVs and appliances that can actually distort demand and it can make it hard for the chip manufacturers to understand the supply chain or understand demand dynamics. So, you know, the semiconductor shortage certainly wasn't caused by the 2025 tariff situation, but the tariffs are adding cost, they're adding some policy risk and they're adding some supply chain friction. So, you know, so overall those are four patterns that we're aware of and that we're looking at closely and that we think are material to this conversation. Thanks, Anna Maria. So Simon, I want to come back to something you said earlier. Never been in doubt that the UKEU and US would would collaborate and have good working relationships, but potentially now that relationship is in doubt as a result of some of these policy changes and and no country is excluded regardless of whether they are long standing US allies. What is your what's your take on on the current situation between the US, EU, the UK and the EU and any comments also you have on this recently announced USUK trade agreement? Yeah, thanks, David. So let me start with your last point, since I'm British myself. So the UK and the US, as you say, have reached a trade agreement. It's a rather peculiar type of trade agreement, quite limited in some ways, but nevertheless it does at least provide the United Kingdom with a degree of certainty around tariffs in some particular areas, including, for example, steel and and aluminium. And to that extent it is welcome. As critics of the deal have pointed out, it still leaves the United the United Kingdom paying higher tariffs or other the United States imposing higher tax on UK goods than was the case at the beginning of the year. But nevertheless, it does provide a degree of security. Interestingly, it contains some potentially quite demanding requirements in terms of connectivity with Chinese linked supply chains in areas like steel and aluminium. And I mentioned that because I think this is going to be a feature of other U.S. trade agreements, that they will seek not only to achieve advantage for the United States in a direct sense, but will also do what they can to limit Chinese trade with their trade partners where that is possible. So I think that's roughly where the United Kingdom is. The European Union is in a very difficult different position. Of course, they're in a position where President Trump announced very high tariffs on the 2nd of April. A week later they were reduced to 10% for 90 days. And I think the European Union has been trying to get the attention of U.S. trade negotiators who, of course are totally overburdened with countries wanting to reach deals with them rather swiftly. And my read of the situation is that Europeans feel that, partly for the sorts of reasons I gave when I spoke earlier, it may be hard to get US attention on the European Union. There is not a a great wellspring of goodwill, it appears, in the administration towards the EU. So that is providing a lot of uncertainty in terms of the European response. Inevitably with the European Union, there are many voices about how it should respond to US tariffs. I would say that at the moment the approach is firm but cautious, A determination not to make the situation worse than it already is, but at the same time a determination not to roll over in the face of increased tariffs on goods. So I think very much a watching brief. One further element, of course, is that there is an investigation under Article 232 of the Trade Expansion Act into pharmaceuticals. That could potentially be very big news, not least because a number of large American pharmaceutical companies have invested in substantial manufacturing plants in countries like Ireland. And disruption to the pricing of pharmaceuticals would potentially be quite a big hit on the United States as well as on those companies and the countries in which they're based. So still plenty for Europeans to feel anxious about. Yeah, thank you, Nick. The the current 90 day pause ends on July 9th. I was just kind of joking, smiling to myself. Wouldn't it have been ironic if Liberation Day had actually been July 4th? But it's not. So as we look, as we look forward, Nick and we'll, we'll stay on terrorists for a moment. Are you optimistic that the administration is going to actually be able to negotiate trade agreements? I think they're in negotiations with more than 60 countries. So it's hard for me not to think it's a significant uphill struggle. But we just appreciate your thoughts, reflections in terms of what lies ahead with regards to these negotiations with regards to to trade agreements. And are we going to see the goal posts continue to shift and potentially see another 90 day? Or are we going to see, as Simon said, a little bit of a whiplash scenario and we're going to go back to to higher tariffs? That is a $64 million question, isn't it? That's why, that's why I gave it to you. I think it's, I think it's if you look at the UK deal and the China deal, I think we have a sense that this is an administration actually is looking for some off off ramps right now. It's seen how markets have responded to the imposition of tariffs. It's seen how markets have rewarded the administration when it's pulled back. So those two deals not necessarily as Simon alluded to are very substantial, but nevertheless seem to settle things up to a point can be provided as as a win. And so as long as partners are prepared to sort of play along with this term, then I think there's there's good potential how many deals can actually be done before July 9th that so can question and presume that they'll go more or less according to size. But I think generally since perhaps that the administration is prepared to sort of declare victory and head home, that will be good news for smaller countries. But we should bear in mind a few things. First, even at 10% tariffs, that's still substantially higher than the global trade trading system has been used to for quite a long time. Second, that there are a number of sectoral tariffs that remain higher. So we still have steel, aluminiums and autos, 25% for Japan in particular, that 25% tariff on autos is a huge deal. And and the only response they've had, the spot in the Trump administration is it's not a matter for a negotiation. So one of the challenges for us as analysts is which of these analysts are there for leverage or for revenue and which are there to actually reassure jobs so we don't steal aluminium autos in the mix. I'd be amazed if by the end of the administration, pharma doesn't go somewhere, doesn't figure in that list somewhere too. And finally, I think the thought that even if we go a little bit beyond July 9th, maybe we have some sort of continuing arrangement in order to tie people over until the deals are done. I think the notion that after a few months this is all going to settle down and we can put the tariff turbulence behind us is probably optimistic. I think if we note that if the tariffs are presented as a success and the deals are presented as success, then there's no reason why the administration shouldn't pivot back to tariffs when it wants to achieve other goals in the coming months. Thanks, David. Can I just add to that one issue, which I don't think we've quite touched on and really many of the attendees on the call will be much better placed than I am to think about it. But that is also the effect on the US economy of tariffs, where the potential for higher inflation and lower growth, certainly from some of the forecasts I've seen are, are quite concerning and are therefore going to impose another sort of discipline on the US administration. It seems to me if if those are accurate forecasts of what is to come. So I think we'll all be watching very closely the US economy, which after all has been one of the key economic drivers in the world and will no doubt continue to be whether it's doing well or not so well for the future. So there's another big slice of input into U.S. policy making which has to be resolved there. Yeah. No, it's so Simon. It's a great point. Happy to bring it up with Anna Maria and Nick if they have comments. I just would add to this, as you know with the Committee for Economic Development being the public policy centre of the Conference Board, we are tracking these economic developments domestically very, very closely. I think the vast majority of economists kind of typically take this approach that you know, what is the impact of, of tariffs on GDP? It tends to dampen GDP. It tends to raise up inflation potentially. I think the the interesting part here as well is dependent on what happens in the in the US economy. And we've we've had these forecasts now recently released, which shows a dampening in GDP growth. How does Trump react to that? We do know his transactional negotiating style, but we also know that he does value movements in the market, whether it's the equities market or the bond market. Bond markets and treasuries have have changed significantly over the last few weeks. So he does look at these external factors and and adjust his strategies accordingly depending what is happening in the economy. But Nick, Anna Maria, anything to to add on Sir Simon's point here? Nick, would you like to go first? No ladies first. OK. Well, I'll just simply say, David, you know, the the CED at CED and in conversations with the economist at the Conference Board, I mean, we've looked at certainly the dynamic that you just described, which is of course, tariffs will have an impact on GDP. You know, we've, we've done the crosswalk to see that that doesn't necessarily mean it's a stagflationary environment or recession. I think that if growth slows all the way down to about 1%, which I think was roughly where we ended up in that forecast, you know, it, it, it will sort of feel like a recession. You know, it will, it will feel the economy will, will feel quite a bit different. And, and also for for Trump, for AUS president and for Trump, perhaps in particular, the the economy, the health of the economy is very much his political capital. So, you know, I think you're right to to highlight that we'll be assessing that health and strength and robustness of the US economy and we'll see that influence some of this policy. The only thing that is hits on inflation is actually going to be another reason for the Fed to pause. And that's something that we know President Trump really doesn't want them to do. You could actually see a bit of a boost in some ways for industrial output out of some of the tariffs if because you could have more domestic import substitution going on. But in terms of headline growth, it rarely works out well, although I think it's worth underlining that what tariffs usually do is lead to currency appreciation in the country that imposes them. But what we've seen last few few months has actually been so extreme that US currency is weakened against many major currencies. OK. It's had a little bit of a of a recovery in the last in last month, but it just shows the extent to which we're in a period right now where some of the usual mechanisms we expect to see working on quite working as expected. Yeah, Thanks, Nick. I think we've covered the global perception of the US as well and some of the answers. So I want to kind of skip over that section in the interest of time and get on to the section that I think everyone is going to find very interesting, which is the geopolitical environment within which we are living and operating and and working. So Simon, from from your perspective and from your perspective as the former, your former roles in the UK government, how, how do you view the level of risk right now around the world which, which conflicts and potential conflicts are most worrying you and, and worrying some of the, the, the conversations that you have with clients? Yeah, it's a very rich menu from which to choose. I have to say, David, thank you. And one of the striking things for me is that because of the number of different crises around the world, some of the big horizontal issues as I think of them, the global issues are not really getting a lot of attention these days, including of course, some of the economic issues that we've been talking about, but also things like climate change. But if we're talking about particular risks and and what we talk to clients about, clearly in Europe, Ukraine is very high up the list. We're watching our screens closely at the moment as two teams of Russians and Ukrainians meet in Istanbul. It will achieve no purpose of course. We've also been watching very carefully where the United States administration has been on all of this. And I think that it President Trump has swung backwards and forwards a little bit in terms of who is more to blame in his view, the Ukrainians or the Russians for the failure to achieve peace. But I do think that as we talk today, the view of the administration, as it's told to me, is very firmly that it is the Russians who are the obstacle to peace more than the Ukrainians. And I think that is very important. Unfortunately, because of the unpredictability that we have spoken about, I don't necessarily assume that that will be the position of the US administration in two or or three weeks time. These these things can change. So where the Europeans, what the Europeans are thinking about at the moment are is will the United States continue to support Ukraine? What does support mean? It's unlikely. I think that under President Trump, we're going to see large donations of weapons to Ukraine, but sales of weapons might take place. But if that's right, what is the resilience of the Ukrainians and the Russians if, as we assume, fruitful negotiations are very unlikely? Because, frankly, we have seen not one IO 2 of evidence, the President Putin's fundamental goals on Ukraine, which are basically the subjugation of Ukraine to Russian power. We've seen no evidence at all that those have changed. So that is something which is concerning Europeans. The Middle East, of course, is the gift that keeps on giving. Successive US administrations have really tried to pull themselves out of the Middle East. But the Middle East, like Hotel California, it always pulls you back in again. At the moment, of course, we're watching Israel gearing up for another round of military activity in Gaza. But also I'm watching very closely the US, Iran negotiations. I think this is in some senses, the Iranian yeah, because the difference between Iran not having a nuclear weapon and having a nuclear weapon is now paper thin. And something needs to give on that, either that there is a successful negotiation or else that Israel and perhaps the United States might think of military action. So. So those would be two things. I mean, I'll just add 1/3, which has already been mentioned, but I, I raise it partly because I think the, the relationship between the United States and China is the single bilateral relationship in the world which is going to going to make the weather around the globe for the next 30-40 years one way or another. So we can segment it and we can talk about China, US in terms of sanctions, we can talk about Taiwan, we can talk about technology, we can talk about all of these things. But trying to work out where this administration is going to go on China, and Nick touched on this quite rightly when he first spoke, is a critical issue for us. And I don't think we know yet. During the first Trump presidency, we saw a perpetual tension of the sort which Nick spoke of between China Hawks and those who are more business oriented and more interested in maintaining links with China. And I don't think we know at the moment how that will work out. But it is of critical importance, not least because China's assertive, aggressive, militarily backed action around Taiwan and South China Seas is going up and up. So those are three issues, but frankly, we could all choose six more. I think the world is in a pretty delicate state. Yeah, Nick, kind of same question, same question to you, Sir. Just where where are you and Oxford Analytica are seeing the the hotspots and where do you see some of these conflicts evolving? And I just want to add another question here and this may bring Sir Simon back in just with regards to Ukraine, like is there any hope insight down the road? And but first, Nick, over over to you. I think we should expect the Russia Ukraine war to grind on. I should completely agree with Simon. It matters hugely who gets the blame. When the Trump administration decides that peace efforts have definitively failed, the Europeans will be praying that the finger is not pointed in Zelensky's direction. India. Pakistan is pretty alarming right now. Ceasefire violations of being, well, accusations to ceasefire violations going on. Remember, this is a different sort of Indian administration. It's the one that we had sort of 10 years ago. So we've had the toughest fighting in 25 years. But India is in a very different place. Pakistan, I think we very happily have international mediation, but that's not really the way Indians see things. If we then move over to Asia, I think there's a possibility that Trump's unpredictability might actually be a deterrent to conflicts in the East China Sea or the South China Sea or even the Yellow Sea with Korea, because nobody can have particular confidence in how Trump would react. But it's very possible also that we stumble into those. Any mention of potential conflicts I think can never, can never safely jump over North Korea without at least pausing there. Very, very difficult country to read. Completely changed its attitude, at least rhetorically, towards the South of the last 18 months. Goodness knows what the implications of that. And has been worryingly quiet as South Korea has gone through turbulence over the last several months. Final one, I just have a word for Algeria and Morocco. Quite nasty dynamics in northeastern Africa as Algeria tries desperately to make up for lost time. And that would be one that the Europeans would actually have a crisis that they didn't expect, weren't prepared for, and would give them quite a difficult that set of choices. I won't mention US Mexico, but it is on my list. Yeah. Well, it's interesting you mentioned Algeria and Morocco. I was going to ask if there are any risks either any of the three of you could come up with with regards to Africa and and Latin America. Nick, is there anything that kind of jumps out there? Africa so possibility of of an outright sort of three or four way conflict in Eastern DLC. Now that could very easily hit the supply of some critical minerals Wells county on the cobalt could be in the mix. That will be that will be my one from there. Could I just add to to to next excellent presentation. I mean, when you think of Africa, it is quite striking that we haven't mentioned Sudan. Sudan has been going through an exceptionally bloody civil war for the last two years. It has uprooted about 13 million people, 13 million, and has been described as the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world ever. And yet it is not top of our agendas, which says something about how we look at the world and how we prioritize matters within it. Is that something, Is that a given the economic importance and would that be one of the key? I fear it is that that Sudan is not a country which is objectively in economic terms, as you say, David, especially important. And I think there is also a bit of a sense of helplessness. It's one of those situations where a number of countries are involved, quite often unhelpfully, and for other countries to become deeply involved is is exceptionally difficult. Yeah. Anna Maria, I want to get you back into the conversation one minute. I just want to pick so Simon and Nick's brain on one other topic. We mentioned Ukraine, we mentioned the EU and, and the wider region of Europe, NATO, the future of NATO, the forthcoming NATO summit in The Hague in June is what, what, if anything, should we expect coming out of this? What should Europe be hoping for and what do you think, either of you or both of you, what do you think will will happen? Let me defer to Simon. Well, the first thing I would say in terms of what Europeans hope for, David, and I hope this won't sound flippant because it genuinely isn't, is that the Europeans desperately do not want a car crash. NATO summits during the first Trump presidency were high wire acts. You may recall that John Bolton, the former national security adviser to President Trump, said that at one of the NATO summits. I can't remember which year, I'm afraid President Trump came close to pulling the United States out of NATO, which would be a disaster, I think, for everybody. So avoiding a car crash is very important. As part of that there has to be a commitment which goes further than the existing commitment by NATO members to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. The figures being spoken about at the moment are an increase to 3 1/2% of GDP with potentially another 1 1/2% of wider security related expenditure. Now, those are massive numbers and we're in a situation at the moment in which most of the Europeans, certainly those that are serious about defence, know that they have to spend more on defence and are trying to do so. But they are also facing huge fiscal pressures at home and struggling to explain to domestic audiences how you will pay for increased defense spending. Is it through higher taxation unpopular? Is it through cutting other programs such as health services, also unpopular? Or is it to be achieved through increased borrowing, which may not be so unpopular domestically, but we've seen how the bond markets can react and most European countries do not have massive fiscal. So there was a real conundrum, a puzzle to be solved here, but I think part of it will certainly be a higher target for defence expenditure from all NATO members. Whether it turns out to be 3 1/2 + 1 1/2, we'll have to see. Nick, anything you want to add on just very briefly? As Simon mentioned, US presidents for a long time said it's time for Europeans to pay more in defence. Europe, I think is down in a moment where they understand that they actually want to develop the capacities to act more autonomously, do not be so reliant on the United States. But this takes time. And so I think what the Europeans would hope for more than anything out of the NATO summit is the sense that they will actually have time to build up those capacities. They they will be able to mobilize the money. It's going to be very difficult, but they will be able to mobilize money if they have to. But time is the crucial variable. Here, yeah, thank you, Anna Maria. Nick and Sir Simon have kind of given us the, the landscape here of the, the challenges facing, you know, businesses and, and governments alike from from your perspective and from the conversations you're having with, with your clients and, and businesses. How? How do businesses begin to navigate properly and effectively the challenges that that face them within this rapidly evolving global environment? Well, thank you and and also that that was quite fascinating to talk about what's what's in front of us this year with NATO and with, with so many International Security concerns and considerations. And you know, that is the environment for businesses. I know that we, we have talked a bit about anti American sentiment, but truly if you were to double click on that topic, you know, you would see that American multinationals are actually dealing with some substantial headwinds and crosswinds in the, in the countries in which they're operating, where anti American sentiment is growing and where there are, you know, company and product boycotts. You know, in, in France, there's a, there's a new app that helps people, you know, avoid, figure out how to avoid American made products. You know, tourism is way down from certain in certain countries. So these are material challenges and you know, in addition to all the de risking activities and no regrets moves that I talked about earlier that companies are undertaking, you know, now companies have to navigate a perception of America that is more contested and they have to actively manage reputational risk and uncertainty and their international relationships. So what we see is a lot of leading companies really focusing on localization, you know, really developing their local identities in some cases, you know, without being disingenuous, you know, trying to find a better balance in terms of the tone of their branding. They're expanding local manufacturing. They're hiring, making more of an effort to hire domestic leadership. And we also see a little bit of a narrative shift, you know, so that companies can emphasize the shared values that with which they operate their businesses regionally and locally and, you know, with an idea to project global stewardship of people, of customers, of business, of the environment and not national allegiance. And and then I think we just see more companies developing a muscle for corporate diplomacy. And I think that some firms are involved more in dialogue with local stakeholders. They're partnering with Ng O's, they're working with universities and local businesses to build trust and to reduce perceptions of US dominance. And, you know, all this has to be done very carefully, you know, because there there is an authenticity that cannot be compromised. And I think that at a very human level, we all have to lean into, you know, the earnestness of our purpose, of our shared values, of the outcomes that we all aspire to and to demonstrate to show the value of the company's activities at a local and regional level. So it's a fascinating time right now, I think for businesses in terms of very practically the way they're operating and running the businesses, but also how they're engaging with stakeholders and conducting reputation risk management. Thank you, Anna Marie. And I think we have to remind ourselves that all of this coming from AUS perspective, all of these challenges and the and the pace of change takes place within the context of some significant domestic US challenges. This goes to a question that's come in, are we watching and are we concerned by a possible US credit rating downgrade? I think the answer to that is depends what happens for the remainder of the of the year. There are plenty of challenges and policy changes facing both the the new US administration and Congress. Just to a few here that jumped to mind, the Tax Cuts and JOBS Act, the debt ceiling, the 2026 budget, expect a continuing resolution on that. Something that came to mind, Congress has passed the budget 4 * 4 times only since 1977, the last in 1997. And we haven't even got into immigration regulatory policy. So some significant challenges facing the US in the context of the these broader geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges. Now what I feared has happened is that we've run out of time. I think the number one thing for me to say is a sincere and very grateful thank you to Sir Simon, Nick and Anna Maria. Top of my list is to get all three of you back again. So expect an e-mail from from us on that three quick housekeeping messages for our listening listeners. Firstly, navigating Washington. This is out of the Conference Board. This is a feel free to scan the QR code and to stay ahead of the new policy landscape. These are alerts that we are publishing each and every day as we analyze pretty much all of Trump's executive orders. On June 19th, we have another webcast. This is responding to US labor shortages again with another fantastic set of panellists, two of which are CED trustees, which is always delightful. July 17th, another webcast, more speakers to be announced here. This is America in perspective. We are six months in at that point. So what and what lies ahead? So stay tuned and we look forward to seeing you again and again. Anna Maria, Nick and Sir Simon, it has been a a real treat for me and I know many of us appreciated your thoughts, insights and reflections. Thank you again to everyone. Take care, appreciate. It. Thank you. Thank you.